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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
A second marriage husband and wife were killed
in a common disaster when their home in which they
were living was destroyed by fire. This is a case to
determine which estate, the descendants of the husband or the descendents of the wife, are entitled to the
loss payable under the home fire insurance policy. The
wife (predecessor of the Plaintiff-Appellants) was the
record title owner of the parcel of real property
on which the home was located which was destroyed. She was also the owner of the great majority
of the destroyed personal property located in the home.
The husband (predecessor of Defendant-Respondent) was the owner of the Fire Insurance Policy covering the home and furniture. The Fire Insurance Company (defendant) on stipulation paid the policy proceeds into court. The court ruled that even though the
home destroyed belonged to the deceased wife, and
she was the owner of furniture and effects destroyed,
the fire insurance policy was ownd by the husband, that
he had an insurable interest in the hvme and furniture
and his administrator was entitled to the proceeds from
the fire insurance policy. The Appellants contend that
the proceeds from the fire insurance policy should be
payable to the Administratrix of deceased husband
only to hold same in trust or as an agent for the owner
(Appellants) of the home and furniture and personal
property destroyed.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found that A. Paul Anderson, deceased husband, was the owner of and paid premiums
nn the Fire Insurance Policy which insured the parcel
;,f re:1l property with home located thereon and contents
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therein owned by his wife, Lila Shand Anderson. ThE
court held that A. Paul Anderson had an insurable interest in the property and that he was entitled to the
proceeds from the insurance policy on fire loss as
against the claims of the owner of the properties destroyed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the Supreme Court de.
Clare that where an insured insures property real or
personal belonging to another, he is acting as an agent
or trustee for the real owner, and that in the event of
loss all proceeds in excess of his interest he holds in
trust for the real owner. In this case the properties de·
~troyed belonged to the appellants and the proceeds re·
ceived from the insurance company from the fire loss
~hould be impressed with a trust and held by the Ad·
ministratrix of A. Paul Anderson's Estate for the ap·
pellants benefit.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the controversy involved in this law·
suit were generally stipulated into the record, there be·
ing no controversy concerning them. They are basical·
ly set forth as follows :
Lila Shand Anderson (predecessor of Plaintiff·
Appellants) and Paul Anderson (predecessor of Inter·
venor-Respondent), a widow and widower from prior
marriages and each having families by said prior mar·
riages, married each other at Las Vegas, Nevada~
on September 25, 1964. At the time of their marriage
each had their own separate estate, which they had ac·
cumulated during their lifetime. Lila Shand Ande~on
was the mother of two daughters, who are the Plaintiffs-Appellants in this action. Paul Anderson was the

father offour children, one of whom is the Administratrix of his Estate and is the Respondent in this action.
Paul and Lila Anderson lived in a home located on
a parcel of real property in Salina, Utah. This home
had been the residence of Paul and his former deceased
wife, Adelia Anderson. After his marriage to Lila
Shand Anderson, he conveyed the title to her, and she,
using her own separate funds completely remodeled,
added on, changed the appearance and modified the
said home. Both Mr. and Mrs. Anderson were killed in
a fire which completely destroyed the said residence on
March 19, 1967.
The home in which Mr. and Mrs. Anderson lived
was originally purchased by Paul Anderson's former
spouse, Adelia Anderson, from Melvin A. Doane, et ux
on or about the 3rd day of June, 1957. This was by a
Warranty Deed to Adelia Anderson. At the time of
this original purchase there was a real estate mortgage
in existence which Mrs. Adelia Anderson (Paul Anderson's first wife) assumed, and which mortgage was
still in existence at the time of the fire loss. It was dated
December 1, 1949 and the original note was for
$8,000.00, (Exhibit 8). There was also a fire insurance policy deposited with mortgage holder which was
made payable, as the interest appeared to the mortgage
holder and Mr. Paul Anderson. The policy was renewed
every three years, the last renewal being dated
the 31st day of May, 1966. The indebtedness on the note
and mortgage (still in name of owners prior to the
Andersons) was payable at the rate of $52.54 plus an
amount on a tax and insurance account each month.
The mortgage holder maintained the tax and insurance
account, and out of part of the payments made each
-5-

month the proceeds were accumulated to pay the taxes
annually due upon the property, and to pay the fire
insurance premiums as they became due. At the time
of the fire loss the fire insurance policy was in the name
of Paul Anderson, and the loss payable clause on the
fire insurance policy was payable as their interest appeared to the mortgage holder, Grove Mortgage Company, and Paul Anderson.
The evidence is that after the marriage of Lila
Shand Anderson and Paul Anderson on the 25th day of
September, 1964, Paul Anderson conveyed to Lila
Shand Anderson, his wife, the parcel of real property
with home located thereon. See Exhibit I Warranty
Deed dated October 15, 1965.
There was evidence offered that immediately before and after said conveyance, Lila Shand Anderson,
using her own separate funds, substantially added on
the outside of the home, completely remodeled the in·
side of the home, and expended sums as shown by Exhibits 10, 11, and 12, in excess of $16,484.00. She fur·
ther purchased new furniture, fixtures and equipment,
and completely refinished the home, and expended
sums in excess of $13,171.87, as shown by Exhibits 13,
17, 18, 19 and 20. There is no dispute but that all of
these funds expended were out of the personal es·
tate of the said Lila Shand Anderson. Mrs. Anderson
also purchased a contiguous parcel of property, as
shown by Exhibit 2, which was used in conjunction
with the home property.
At the time of the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Ander·
son, the decedent, Lila Shand Anderson, left by her Last
Will and Testament (Exhibit 9) a life estate in the said
home to Paul Anderson, with the remainder to her tw0
-6-

daughters, the Appellants in this action. Paul Anderson died intestate, and his estate will be divided equally
among his four children. The question involved is who
is entitled to the fire insurance policy proceeds which
were payable for the destroyed home and personal contents.
Exhibit 16 shows the home remodeling plans
with contractor, Valley Builders. Exhibit 12 shows
payment to contractor of $9,091.55 for the remodeling. Exhibit 10 shows payment to contractor
Venitelle of $6,000.00 for remodeling. Exhibit 11 shows
payment to Painting Contractor Edwards of $1,392.96.
Mrs. Lila Shand Anderson completely refurnished and redecorated the home. Exhibit 13 consists of
23 checks for furniture and furnishings in sum of
$6,659.52, Exhibit 17 for $2,496.59 for furniture and
effects, Exhibit 18, $1, 705.23 for an Air Conditioner,
Exhibit 19 for $1, 705.23 for landscaping and Exhibit
20 for Exercycle, $952.43. All was destroyed in the fire.
Both parties also listed numerous items of old personal
property that was owned by the decedents which was
also destroyed by the fire.
The Respondents claim the policy of fire insurance
was a personal contract, that Paul Anderson had an
insurable interest in the property which was destroyed.
The appellants contend that while the proceeds of the
policy are payable to the Administratrix of this estate
the proceeds should be impressed with a trust in favor
of Appellants who were entitled to the properties destroyed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I: DOES A HUSBAND HA VE SUCH
AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN HIS WIFE'S
-7-

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT HE
CAN TAKE A FIRE INSURANCE POLICY OUT
ON SAID PROPERTIES AND UPON THE DESTRUCTION OF SAME KEEP THE PROCEEDS
PAYABLE FOR THE LOSS, WITHOUT HOLDING
SAME IN TRUST FOR HIS WIFE AND THE sue.
CESSOR OWNERS OF THE SAID DESTROYED
PROPERTY?
POINT II: IN THE EVENT A FIRE INSURANCE POLICY IS MAINTAINED AND PAID FOR
BY A CREDITOR WHO ACCUMULATES A TAX
AND INSURANCE ACCOUNT OUT OF MONTHLY
PAYMENTS PAID ON THE OBLIGATION, ARE
THE PROCEEDS PAYABLE UPON SUCH FIRE
FIRE LOSS DESTROYING THE SAID PROPERTY
PAYABLE FOR THE BENEFIT FOR THE RECORD OWNER OF SAID POLICY, OR FOR THE
BENEFIT OF THE OWNER OF THE PROPERTY
DESTROYED.
ARGUMENT ON BOTH POINTS
It is the Appellants contention that there are cer·
tain basic rules that must be considered in determin·
ing who is entitled to the proceeds from Fire Insurance.

In the State of Utah, every married woman has a
separate estate of property whether it was acquired
before or during marriage. She may hold same, as if
she were unmarried, (See Utah Code Annotated
30-2-1).
All conveyances betWeen husband and wife are the
same as conveyances between other persons. (See Utah
Code Annotated 30-2-3).

The husband owes the duty of support to his wife,
including food, fuel, power and protection.
The basic rule in insurance law is that an insurance contract is one for indemnity and not for profit,
and contractual or legal liability is imposed upon the
insured to account to the real owner for the property
destroyed. (See 68 ALR 1344).
In the instant case the basic question is whether
or not the fact that the husband had the insurance
policy in his name should allow him to, through his successor as administratrix of his estate, to take the proceeds received from the property and distribute them
out to his heirs, or whether the procceeds should be used
to reimburse the parties who are entitled to said property, and who suffered the loss as a result of the fire,
namely, Lila Shand Anderson, his wife, and through
her, her successors in interest, the Appellants in this
action.
The authorities are clear that the only person allowed to recover on an insurance contract is a person
with an insurable interest. Originally the cases stated
that a person other than the legal title owner could not
insure the property of another.
Richards, on Insurance, Section 515, states that if
each one of several persons having an insurable interest in property were allowed to take out separate insurance to its full value, and had the right under his policy
to separate collection for the full value, the moral hazard would be greatly enhanced. The insurance would at
once be regarded as a matter of promising speculation,
and any loss by fire so far from being a misfortune
would be a source of gain to the Insured.
-9-

The reason for the rule, is that his interest must
at the time of loss be of such a nature that a substantial
burden of the fire loss would fall exclusively upon him
regardless of the technical character of the title.
There are many cases which hold that a husband
has an insurable interest when he has resided on the
property, where he has a life estate therein, all of them
being exceptions to the general rule, and all being for
the purpose of allowing a recovery against the insurance company.
Appellant was not able to find many cases that
were comparable with the fact situation herein. But,
in 68 ALR 1348, it did cite cases where recovery was
allowed, but subject to the person accounting to the
real owner, for the property destroyed. Most of these
cases were decided on the basis that the husband who
was insuring the property in his wife's name, was act·
ing as an agent for her, the real owner. Kludt vs. Ger·
man Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 152 Wisconsin 637,
114 NW 321.
Where the husband was in possession and had the
beneficial use of wife's property, the court has held
that there was nothing in the policy indicating that the
husband's interest alone was insured, and the transac·
tion evidenced an intention on the part of the husband;
to insure his wife's interest on her behalf.
In Trade vs. Barraclif f, 45 NJR 543, 46 Am Re·
ports 792, the court held where the husband was insur·
ing property in his wife's name, he was merely acting
as an agent for the real party of interest, and alloweo
him to recover for the real party's benefit.
There are many cases allowing recovery of the fuli
amount of insurance, with the amount to be held by th~
-1(}-

insured in trust for the real owner. (See Dakin vs.
Liverpool L & G. Insurance Co., 77 NY 600).
There are also many cases where there is a transfer of property with the title of the property in the
prior owner at the time of the loss. In these cases the
insurance proceeds were held in trust for the new purchaser. See Couch "Insurance 2d," Sec. 25.1. This citaiton also states that the husband may act as agent to
effect recovery on behalf of his wife, the agency being
implied from the relationship of the parties. "Couch"
follows the basic rule saying that a husband has no
insurable interest in his wife's property, but that if he
has some pecuniary or beneficial interest in the property or might suffer some disadvantage from it, he has
an insurable interest but that in all cases he is merely
acting as an agent for his wife, for the purpose of recovering, and that she is entitled to the property when
it is recovered.
Appleton "Insurance Law and Practice," Section
2109 states that an insurance policy is not void because the name of the insured is not the name of the
owner. In Section 2149 it states however, that generally the husband has no insurable interest in the property
of his wife. (Cites Oregon cases, 133 Pac. 1183.) There
are again a few cases treating the husband more kindly,
saying that he has the insurable interest when he has
certain rights in the property. Once again there are
cases allowing the husband to recover on an insurance
policy on his wife's property, but stating that the reason the recovery is allowed is because he is a guardian
for his wife, or that he holds the proceeds as trustee
for her.
-11-

Under Section 1049, of "Law of Insurance," it
states a wife's property insured (in husband's name),
and he is a mere trustee, or legal payee of the sum recoverable for her use and benefit. It cites Marts vs.
Cumberland Midual Fire Insurance Company 44 NJ
L 478 and Miotae vs. Milwaukee Mechanics Insurance
Company 113 Mich. 166, 71 NW 463.
Utah Code Annotated 31-19-4 under Fire Insurance, defines "Insurable Interest"( 1) No contract of insurance on property or of
any interest therein or arising therefrom,
shall be enforcable except for the benefit of
persons having an insurable interest in the
things insured.

(2) "Insurable Interest" as used in this Section
means any lawful and substantial economic
interest in the safety or preservation of the
subject of the insured free from loss destruction, or pecuniary damage.

In National Farmers' Union Property vs. Casualty
Co., 4 Ut2nd, 286 p2nd 249, 61 ALR2nd 635, recovery was
allowed to a husband insuring his wife's property on the
assumption that he was representing his wife's inter·
ests, and that rule is in conformity with that large class
of cases which hold that where insured who has merely
a qualified interest in the property, and who insures the
property to the extent of its full value is merely acting
as agent of the real owner, expressly or impliedly, or
merely as agent for the undisclosed principal. Suffice
it to say, that in all cases the agent with limited inter·
ests, acting for the principal, may insure the property
for its full value, and in cases of loss recover the full
value, to hold the excess over his interest in trust for
-12-

the real owner. (Trade Insurance Company vs. Barraclif, 45 NJL 543, 46 Am Rep. 792, Waring vs. Indemnity Fire Insurance Company, 45 NY 606, 6 Am Rep.
146, Fox vs. Capital Insurance Company, 93 Iowa 7,
61 NW 211, and Dakin vs. Liverpool, 77 NY 600.)
In our present case there is no question but that the
loss falls upon the Appellants. It is their house and furniture and personal property that has been destroyed
by fire, and the proceeds on the insurance policy should
be available for them. It was the Respondent's contention that because her predecessor paid for the insurance contract she should have the funds payable for the
loss, even though they concede they do not own the title
to the property. To allow them to recover would be inequitable and give them a great windfall. It is interesting to note that the premiums on the fire insurance
poylicy were always paid by the mortgage holder, and
the insurance policy was held by the mortgage holder
for its protection. Respondent contends that Paul Anderson paid the payments on the mortgage. This is not
in dispute and the logical answer is that Paul Anderson
owed his wife the duty of support, which would cover
not only fuel, power, telephone, food, but also the mortgage payments. He also owed her a duty of protection,
which the Appellants contend would also cover the payment of fire insurance protection.
It appears to the Appellants that this is a situation where a constructive or resulting trust should be
established for the benefit of the real owner.
Equity imposes a constructive or resulting trust to
prevent one from unjust enrichment. There are many
:ases holding that a husband is deemed to hold property
1
n trust for the benefit of his wife. Our Supreme Court
-13-

recently held in the case of Little vs. Alder, 19 Ut2 163,
428 p2 156, that where separate funds of a woman were
used to purchase property in her husband's name, that
he was deemed to hold the said property under a resulting trust in her favor, even though the title might have
been in his name. It holds that under certain circum.
stances a presumption of resulting trust arises, based
on the husband and wife relationship.
It is the Appellants' contention that whenever the
court has allowed the husband to recover on an insurance policy on his wife's property, that it has been based
upon a trust or agency theory imposing upon the in·
sured person the duty to account to the real owner of
the property destroyed, which in this case would be
the Appellants.

The evidence is clear that Lila Shand Anderson
made very extensive and major improvements on the
parcel of real property, as shown by the plans Exhibit
16. The improvements were substantial, being over
$16,000.00, for repairs and modifications. She placed
in the home new furniture, equipment and supplies in
excess of the sum $11,000.00, See Exhibits 13, 17, 18,
19 and 20. All of these funds are either for furniture
or personal items or expended on property that was
given to her by her husband and came out of her own
personal estate. The fact that the Fire Insurance Policy
was held in the name of Paul Anderson was in all prob·
ability an error, because the mortgage holder, Grove
Mortgage Company had never been notified of any con·
veyances of the property since it was originally held in
the name of Adelia Anderson, see Stipulation Page 11.
As far as the creditor, Grove Mortgage Company, bad
knowledge of, the home property was still held in the
-14-

name of Mrs. Adelia Anderson, the first wife of Paul
Anderson, and there were no records in the creditors'
hands showing any of the subsequent conveyances.
In the event of the death of Lila Shand Anderson,
had the property not been destroyed, it would have gone
according to her Last Will and Testament, which provided that her husband, Paul Anderson, have a life estate in said residence, with the residence and the property located therein then going to her two daughters.
Consequently, had the property not been destroyed, the
appellant's after Paul Anderson's death would have
received full benefits of same. The only purpose of in~
surance is to make whole a person who has suffered
loss. There is no conceivable way that you can determine in this case that the Respondants suffered the
loss. The Appellants cannot understand how the respondant has lost by reason of this fire. Consequently,
this is a clear case of unjust enrichment, in Respondant's favor, which is contrary to the basic concept of
casualty insurance.

a

Lila Shand Anderson over the marriage period of
two years, poured into the residence great sums
of money out of her personal estate, to make the
home a place of beauty for herself and her spouse.
It is obvious from the facts that have been stipulated in
the record, that her husband was of the opinion that the
property should be hers because he conveyed it to her
by Warranty Deed. The fact that the mortgage holder
did not have knowledge of either the conveyance to Paul
Anderson or of the subsequent conveyance to Lila Shand
Anderson indicates that it was never the intention of
Paul Anderson to take the property away from Lila
Shand Anderson, by reason of Fire Insurance Policy.
-15-

The obvious purpose of a fire insurance policy is to
make whole the person who suffers a loss.
The Respondents gave testimony to the court for
the purpose of showing that their father had items of
personal property in the home. This is not conteste~
but it was admitted during cross examination that
many of these items had been turned in, conveyed away
or replaced. The important part of this testimony is
that it was given for the purpose of showing that estate
of Paul Anderson did claim an equitable interest in
certain items of personal property. Consequently, it can
be assumed that they were in essence stating that in all
fairness, the proceeds from the fire insurance should
be divided between the parties, in conformity with their
respective interests in the property destroyed. The
basic principles of equity would follow this doctrine,
and it appears to the Appellants that the court in equity
should have awarded the value of the real property to
the Plaintiff-Appellants, who were without any ques·
tion entitled to it, and then the court in equity should
have made an apportionment as to the personal prop·
erty proceeds, and divided the proceeds from the fire
insurance policy, in conformity with the value owned by
each of the parties.
This was argued to the court at the time of trial
without success. The purpose of a trust, as developed
under the law, based upon the court acting in equity,
is to prevent an unfairness. It is clearly unfair to allow ,
the respondents the great unjust enrichment of receiv·
ing the entire proceeds from the destruction of this
home and personal property- $21,620.00 (after mortgage payment), which should have belonged to the Ap·
pellants, because it was their mother's property that
was destroyed and they were deprived of it.
-16-
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CONCLUSION

Appellants ask the court to reverse the lower
court's decision, and impress a trust upon the proceeds
from the insurance and that the Respondents be direc~
ed to deliver the sum of $21,620.00 to Appellants for
the loss they suffered, or in the alternative that the
court reverse the lower court's decision, and that the
lower court be directed to apportion the insurance proceeds, based upon the loss which was caused by fire to
each of the parties.
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